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The author describes the causes and roots of terrorism in Bosnia and
Hercegovina, all of which are deeply rooted in the former Yugoslav sys-
tem.  Yugoslavia, often idealized in the West as a model for today’s multi-
ethnic ideology, supported, trained, and even gave refuge to terrorist
groups around the world.  Yugoslavia earned approximately 700 million
dollars a year selling weapons to “non-aligned” countries. 
In addition to its problematic activities in the area of foreign affairs,
the Yugoslav communist government committed terrorist acts against its
own citizens in the diaspora who opposed Yugoslav policies.  Between
1945-1990, it organized the murder of 73 Croatian emigrants.  
With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, five new states emerged.  One
is Bosnia and Hercegovina.  The author describes the birth and develop-
ment of terrorist groups in this country, placing emphasis on today’s most
dangerous form, Islamic terrorism, which is supported by the Muslim gov-
ernment in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and thousands of  “mujahedeen”
who arrived during the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina to fight for Islam.
Since the end of the war, Bosnia and Hercegovina has been a  unde-
clared protectorate. 
The international community holds the most power, but also carries
the most responsibility for the situation in this country.  Many terrorism
issues have not been resolved, often because political problems are con-
cealed in order to maintain the image of an ideal multi-ethnic community
and create the impression that the creators of the Dayton Agreement have
succeeded.  The author warns that such a view toward terrorism is
extremely dangerous, and that political trials such as the Leutar case are
unacceptable in the democratic world.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was, until its independence and interna-
tional recognition in April 1992, one of the six republics of the
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Socialistic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ). Thus, in order
to explain the phenomena of terrorism in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it is necessary to first explain the relationship
between Yugoslavia and terrorism, considering that this later
strongly affected Bosnia’s position toward terrorism. Up until the
disintegration of the Socialistic Federative Republic, Yugoslavia
had been repeatedly accused of  supporting international terror-
ism, and at the same time of directly using terrorist methods on
their citizens in emigration. Yugoslavia responded to the accusa-
tions with counter-accusations, charging that the (western) coun-
tries accusing them utilized double standards towards terrorism.1
In order to address the problem of “double standards”, the
definition of terrorism being used at that time in Yugoslavia needs
to be considered.  In the Yugoslav Military Encyclopedia of 1975,
there was no definition of the word “terrorism”. Terror is defined
as “a violent action (system of government) whose goal is fright-
ening or destroying the opponent, etc.”2 In  1986 in Belgrade,
“The Security Lexicon” was published, in which terrorism was
defined as “planned and systematic use of acts of violence to
spread fear among people who are a members of government
institutions or organized groups for the purpose of reaching cer-
tain political goals.”3 In the Criminal Law of SFRJ, international
terrorism is addressed in section 155a, and: “whoever with the
intention of harming a foreign country, liberation movement, or
international organization performs the kidnapping of some per-
son or some other type of violence; creates an explosion or fire,
or performs a generally dangerous act or uses generally danger-
ous means endangers a person’s life or property of value, will be
punished...”, etc.4
The General Encyclopedia of the Lexicographic Institute of
1982 makes a distinction between terror and terrorism and pres-
ents both definitions. Terror is defined in the same manner as in
the Military Encyclopedia: “use of violence  whose goal is to fright-
en or destroy the opponent”.  Terrorism is defined as “a way for
individuals, political groups, and organizations to fight against the
existing social-political orders and political systems based on the
use of organized violence...”.5 The Yugoslav Military Lexicon
defines terror as “the use of violence to frighten a political oppo-
nent and break his resistance…”, while terrorism is defined as
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“organized and sustained use of violence with the intention to
destroy by provoking fear and personal insecurity among the citi-
zenry the authority of the state or to achieve certain political
goals”.6 There is a certain politicization in regard to these defini-
tions, especially if they are considered in their entirety.
Nonetheless, Yugoslav theory considers terror to be violence com-
mitted by the state (violence from above), and terrorism to be vio-
lence committed against the state (violence from below). 
A problem arises with the definition of international terrorism
taken from SFRJ law, where the significant, ambiguous construc-
tion “liberation movements” appears. Here terrorism enters the
political, ideological sphere and there is no longer a consensus
on its definition.  Those who for some are freedom fighters are for
others terrorists. 
These definitions are not intended to  explain the concept of
terrorism; they serve only to enlighten readers about how the term
was understood in former Yugoslavia. Terrorism is difficult to
define in final terms because political changes also alter the defi-
nition of words, and nobody refers to himself as a terrorist any-
more. The concept has been replaced by less objectionable des-
ignations: fighters for freedom, justice, human rights and so forth.
It is important to provide some of the newer definitions of terror-
ism so that they can be compared with what former Yugoslavia
considered terrorism and what is today considered terrorism in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rest of the world. 
One of the better definitions of terrorism is that of the
American FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation): “an illegal use of
force and violence against persons or properties in order to fright-
en or force the government, civil society, or any other part of soci-
ety to do something, their goal being the promotion of their own
political or social goals”.7
The American State Department uses a definition of terrorism
found in Chapter 22 of the USA codex, section 2656: “Terrorism
is politically motivated violence with premeditation which is per-
formed against non-combatants by sub-national groups or secret
agents, usually with the intent to influence public opinion”.8 The
Ministry of Defense of the United States of America defines terror-
ism as: “an illegal use or threat to use force or violence against
individuals or properties in order to frighten governments or soci-
eties, frequently in order to reach political, religious, or ideologi-
cal goals”.9 So it is clear that different services of the same state
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institutions define terrorism differently, depending on their area of
activity and authority.
As mentioned, Yugoslavia has been  accused in the past of
supporting or participating in international terrorism: condoning
the presence of known terrorist “Carlos” in Yugoslavia; the arrest
but failure to extradite four members of the Baader-Meinhof
group; connections to the Italian Red Brigades; and the failure to
extradite (protection of) the Palestinian, Abu Abbas. In 1978,
Austria’s “Die Presse” accused the Yugoslav government of pro-
tecting (hiding in their territorial waters) a Lebanese ship which
was transporting “Arrow” anti-aircraft missiles produced by the
Soviet Union for the “Red Brigades”.10 The Yugoslav government
responded to these accusations with counter-accusations that
western “reactionary countries” supported and tolerated anti-
Yugoslav emigrant terrorist organizations.  At the same time,
Yugoslavia was accused of using terrorist methods to eliminate its
emigrant citizens.11 As a defense against these ever-increasing
accusations,Yugoslav terrorism theorists proposed the use of all
resources at its disposal, as well as the nonaligned movement and
the international community as a whole, to achieve a redefinition
of liberation and revolutionary movements and thus invalidate the
indictments against Yugoslavia.12
A short review of former Yugoslavia’s relationship toward lib-
eration-terrorist movements can serve to illuminate certain past
events and issues.
By command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of SFRJ, November 17th, 1995, the Educational Security
Center was formed in Pancevo, which included the School of
Security and School of Military Police, and later the school for
members of foreign armies from nonaligned, friendly countries
and liberation movements.13
The School of Security was   renamed the Intelligence-Security
Education Center (OBŠC) in 1975.
As part of the same structure, the Inspectors School of the
Second Federal Administration for National Defense (SSNO) was
formed in Kovin in 1964, as well as the School for Diversionary
and Anti-diversionary Activities.
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In the 1988/89 school year, 36 regular classes were offered
in the OBŠC (courses lasted thirty days for reserve and three
months for active officers) and three seminars (which lasted from
5 to 10 days). The training of the second generation of officers
undergoing the year long program in the intelligence-security
courses KŠŠT KoV and final schooling (4 years) of the Military
Academy (VA) and military high-school (SVŠ) KoV, special units
course, was thus achieved. 1339 auditers and military-school stu-
dents finished, and the average grades were very good.14
Between 1960 and 1986 Pancevo, over 800 foreign auditers
from 10 countries and 4 liberation movements were educated in
OBŠC.15 Members of liberation movements were also trained in
Yugoslav military schools to become helicopter pilots, command-
ers of low and higher level units, and officers in various special
areas and services.16
Yugoslavia assisted in various ways almost all “liberation and
revolutionary movements”, including:  MPLA – Angola; FRELIMO
– Mozambique; PAIGC – Guinea Bissau; SWAPO – Namibia; the
Patriotic Front ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe; ANC in South
Africa; the Liberation Committee OAJ; the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO); the NR in Angola; Tanzania; the National
Unity Front of Chile;17 and others. Even though this assistance to
the liberation and revolutionary movementswas was offered with
no strings attached, it still brought large material profits.  As a
result of its policy of nonalignment and benevolence toward these
movements, exports of Yugoslav artillery and military equipment to
foreign (nonaligned) countries increased considerably. In 1974
alone, there were more export agreements reached than there
had been during the past 20 years. 66 Yugoslav companies
received contracts worth approximately 713 million dollars. The
full capacity of the military industry was engaged for years into the
future.18
In addition to military institutions, assistance and training of
the “liberation and revolutionary movements and organizations”
was also provided by institutions which were a part of the Federal
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Secretariat of Internal Affairs; specifically, the federal services of
state security and the Security Institute, which was formed by the
Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs.19
These activities, or indications that they existed, gave foreign
countries on the other side of the ideological curtain the ammu-
nition they needed to accuse the Yugoslav government of sup-
porting terrorism.  It was also accused of using terrorist methods
to eliminate its citizens in emigration. 
Partial investigations were undertaken in the Republic of
Croatia after it gained independence in 1991; they revealed that
the Yugoslav government, through its intelligence-security servic-
es, had liquidated 73 Croatian emigrants, of which five are still
missing.20 In a book by Božo Vukušic, secretary of  the “The
Commission to Certify Postwar Victims of the Communist System
Abroad”, and the “Committee to Certify War and Postwar
Victims”, it is written that agents of the Yugoslav secret service
killed 69 Croatian emigrants throughout the world between
1946-1990, while eight are listed as missing  (their disappear-
ance is assumed to be connected to actions of the Yugoslav serv-
ices).  Also, 24 unsuccessful assassinations are recorded, the vic-
tims having survived after suffering various degrees of injury or
aftereffects. Three emigrants were kidnapped, and four kidnap
attempts failed, as the victims succeeding in saving themselves.21
On the other hand, Ðuro Rebic, a former employee of the
Federal Services of National Security who was for most of his
working career responsible for clerical matters and internal com-
munications,22 and later acted as a publicist for the SDB, writes in
his book Spies, diversionists, terrorists about numerous terrorist
attacks by emigrant organizations against Yugoslav objects. Rebic
claims: “The extreme pro-fascist Yugoslav emigration performed
between 1946-1985 about 400 terrorist actions in the country
and abroad which resulted in the death of 102 and wounding of
330 persons”. Among other things, Rebic claims that the
“Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood” alone (founded in 1961),
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performed 120 terrorist attacks during the first year after its cre-
ation, in which 53 persons died and 118 were wounded.23
It is interesting to note that Rebic, true to Yugoslav communist
policies towards emigrants, and especially Croatian emigrants,
labels all the emigrant organizations fascist, criminal, and terror-
ist, although the majority was not.  This was done in order to polit-
ically disqualify them.24 Rebic’s text represents the official political
stance and thus serves as an accusation directed at the “western”
governments: “A complete symbiosis of reactionary-bourgeois ele-
ments and the dregs of defeated fascism and its collaborators has
come into existence. Unanimous in their attitude towards social-
ism, they differ only in the methods of struggle they employ to
destroy it, though in time these differences are becoming fewer.”25
It is indicative that in Rebic’s and similar books and articles, the
deaths of Croatian and other emigrants are rarely even men-
tioned, except when attempts are made to disseminate disinfor-
mation, arouse suspicion and provoke discord in emigrant circles,
or disguise Yugoslav secret service operations.  In such cases, it
was claimed that the victims died as a result of disagreements
between various emigrant organizations.
The true state of affairs is illustrated clearly by a trial that took
place in 1981 in the western Germany city of Saarbrucken, after
which three Yugoslav secret police agents were sentenced  to a
total of 35 years in prison for planning and organizing the mur-
der of at least one Yugoslav (Croatian) emigrant.26 At that time,
the German weekly paper “Der Spiegel” quoted the prosecutor in
the trial: “While the government in Bonn is negotiating with
Yugoslav politicians about containing international terrorism,
Yugoslavia itself is violating the spirit of these  negotiations and
committing acts of terrorism on foreign territory intended to “liq-
uidate” political refugees from Yugoslavia living abroad”.  The
“activities” of the Yugoslav government were also harshly attacked
by the Canadian press (The Vancouver Sun) in 1979 and in the
Swedish “Parlament” on October 14th, 1980.
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Two years earlier, the American publicist Jack Anderson pub-
lished sections from the secret report of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United States Senate, which alleged that the
Yugoslav secret service in the USA was “probably committing mur-
ders”. Senator McGovern requested a thorough investigation, but
everything was quickly hushed up.27 Temporary political pragma-
tism had apparently taken precedence over long term security. 
Terrorism as a declaration of war 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s struggle for independence began with
a literal bang.  In the months prior to the outbreak of war, explo-
sive devices were planted, kidnappings occurred, and the first
human victims fell. The situation was worst in Herzegovina; that is,
in Mostar, as this was where the largest concentration of Croatians
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was located.  They, along with many
Muslims, were unwilling to accept Serbian domination, as it was
clear to them what was being planned for them in Yugoslavia and
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The situation worsened when the war
escalated in the Republic of Croatia, Serbian reservists marched
on Herzegovina, and the Serbian army attacked Dubrovnik. 
Between January 1st 1991 and February 25th 1992, when
neither war nor peace reigned on the territory of Herzegovina, 72
explosions were recorded in areas which were under the authori-
ty of the Center of Security Services, Mostar, 28 of which took
place in the city of Mostar itself; within the next month, six more
explosions occurred in Mostar. 28 In addition, there were also sev-
eral kidnappings and murders. 
The counterintelligence service of the Federal Secretariat for
National Defense (SSNO), which operated inside the JNA (and
was known as KOS) played a significant part in the preparation of
aggression on Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Almost all
the leaders of the rebellions in Croatia officially collaborated with
this service, which directed, armed, trained, and protected them
from the police forces. In the beginning, this protection was rep-
resented as “dividing parties at war”, work for which they solicit-
ed tactical and often strategic assistance.  For the most part, the
JNA simply protected positions the Serbian paramilitary forces had
overtaken.  These paramilitary units later became official units of
the joint Yugoslav, that is, Greater Serbian, armed forces. 
In addition to equipping the paramilitary units, the counterin-
telligence service also planned terrorist actions which were part of
a wider plan to politically compromise and block the newly
formed republic government. 
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The operative group “Opera”, which was formed in conjunc-
tion with the War Air Force Command and Anti-aircraft Defense
(RV and PVO) of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) is an example
of this. Its role was to conduct propaganda-subversive action, and
it was comprised of members of special services within the Central
Committee of the Federal Communists of Croatia (CK SKH). The
group conducted a series of terrorist actions, including: the rock-
et attacks on the Banski dvori (the then Presidential palace) which
were intended to result in the murder of the Croatian president,
and the mining of the Jewish district and cemetery in order to
compromise the Republic of Croatia and discredit the govern-
ment. Members of this group were tried in Belgrade and Zagreb,
indicted for a variety of offenses.  In addition to terrorist actions,
they devised and performed numerous psychological-propagan-
dist actions; for example, organizing a campaign against
Herzegovinans specifically, and Croatians in general throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also were also the first to introduce
the thesis of a parallel chain of command in regard to the the
functioning of the government in the Republic of Croatia, which
was later used to bolster the claim about a parallel chain of com-
mand existing in the Croatian army, etc.29
At the same time, the intelligence-security services of the JNA
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the assistance of the majority of
the Serbian personnel in MUP and other institutions, conducted
diverse, even terrorist, actions.  Following the example of the
Jewish district bombings in Zagreb, the Partisan cemetery in
Mostar was mined. This was only one of a series of explosions
based upon a plan to “create controlled panic”; that is, controlled
terror,30 in order to frighten the local population and incite it into
promoting a change of government by means of protests and
capitulation to the “Yugoslav forces”. As a response to the aggres-
sion, the Croatian and Muslim sides formed defense groups and
then units, which initially lacked clear and firm organization. This
resulted in isolated acts by individuals or small groups which
could be characterized as terrorist, but these were exceptions and
should be viewed within the specific situation; that is, the struggle
for survival. 
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The European Union recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on
April 7th, 1992, and on the same day it was recognized by the
Republic of Croatia as well. From that day on, the ex-JNA and
Serbian paramilitary forces changed its tactics and began to use
military force instead of violence. The limited attacks on Croatians
and to some extent Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina became
an all out  aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina.31
Terrorism and war
When it was fought in cities and villages, especially in the begin-
ning before the front lines were established, the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina produced a horrendous number of civilian victims.
Large territories were occupied by force, around 70% of the terri-
tory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the territory was ethnically
cleaned by means of terror and violence.  Protected objects and
individuals were systematically destroyed (civil population, cultur-
al and religious objects) in order to eradicate the identity of the
enemy. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina’s case, it is clear that the aggressor
(the ex-JNA, assisted by Bosnian and Herzegovinan Serbs from the
Serbian Democratic Party) executed these policies of terror by uti-
lizing military strategy, and, even more tragic,  alternated these
policies with those of genocide in attacks on protected zones.32
In response to the aggression, defense groups were organized
on the Croatian and Muslim sides, units which lacked a strong
organization and themselves resorted at first to terror (mining, kid-
napping, and so on).  However, this should be viewed as a spe-
cific situation in which a struggle for sheer survival was being
fought. 
As an outcome of the Greater Serbian aggression on Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the occupation of a larger part of the terri-
tory, the social and government structures collapsed and the eth-
nic balance on the still free territory was changed, which led to
conflicts between the Croatians and Muslims. During this conflict,
which was characterized by crime as well, the policies of terror
were also used, most frequently in the form of military strategy.
Still, it is important to note that there was an escalation of terror-
ist actions after the war in the Croat-Muslim (Bosnian) Federation,
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and that the perpetrators of those actions were predominantly
members of radical Islamic organizations who had arrived during
the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina to assist the Muslims in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. In order to understand the ultimate goals of this
assistance, it is necessary to analyze the relations between the
Islamic world and Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Political Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina
At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, political
Islam became more active and organized in international politics,
in part as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. At the
end of 1969, an international, independent political organization
of Muslim countries, the Organization of Islamic Conferences
(OIK), was constituted. 
Even though this organization was primarily religious, it was
also an ideological, economic, and cultural organization of
Islamic countries, which supported the idea that Islam was not
merely a religion, but also represented a specific view of the world
and organization of society. The first OIK conference on a ministry
level was held March 23-25,1970, in Jeddah. At the third minis-
terial level conference of the OIK, February 29-March 4, 1972,
also in Jeddah, the by-laws of the OIK were adopted in the pres-
ence of representatives from 30 countries,  the operating princi-
ples affirmed and the general secretary and three assistants
appointed.  It was decided that their headquarters would be in
Jeddah until such time that Jerusalem was liberated; thereafter,
the headquarters would be relocated to Jerusalem.33
At the third conference of the OIK in Taef, January 25-28,
1981, in Saudi Arabia, there was an increased focus by the OIK
on Muslim minorities throughout the world; that is, on countries
which did not officially belong to the Muslim community.
Particular interest was shown in the Muslim (Turkish) part of
Cyprus, and a decision was made to assist the Muslim communi-
ty in Cyprus both morally and materially. At the OIK conference in
Niger in August, 1982, a resolution was adopted to research and
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examine the positions of Muslims in countries which were not
members of the OIK. In that context, the position of Muslims in
Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak, Kosovo) was also
addressed. 
At an OIL consultation in Cairo (August, 1982) on the tasks
of “political Islam”, Islam in Yugoslavia was one of the topics and
a comment was made that the dissemination and activation of
Islam in Yugoslavia would facilitate closer contacts with the
Muslim minority in the Balkans and the dioceses in western
European countries.34
On March 23rd, 1983, members of the national security serv-
ice of the Secretariat of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina broke into Alija Izetbegovic’s apartment with a
search warrant. After a detailed search, Izetbegovic was brought
to the service headquarters and was placed in detention.  A large
group of people was arrested along with him; Izetbegovic and
four others were brought to trial in the late 1940s and early 1950s
for their membership in an illegal group, “Young Muslims”.
The indictment was based on Izetbegovic’s book The Islamic
Declaration which presents the principles of the Islamic move-
ment. Izetbegovic was sentenced to 14 years, and the others to a
total of 90 years. 
In his final statement, Izetbegovic said: “I was a Muslim and
that is what I will remain. I considered myself a fighter for Islam in
the world and I will feel this way for the rest of my life. Islam was
for me a symbol of everything beautiful and noble and represent-
ed a promise or hope of a better future for the Muslim nations, for
a dignified and free life; in other words, everything worth living
for.”35
Izetbegovic was released from prison on November 25th,
1988, after a ruling  by the Presidency of Yugoslavia. A year later
he began to organize a Muslim party, the basis for which had
been formulated in the Foca prison, and introduced it at a press
conference in Sarajevo on March 27th, 1990. The party, “The
Democratic Action Party” (SDA) was defined as a party of
Yugoslav citizens with Muslim cultural-historical ties. For the
party’s flag, the “Spanish Muslims” design was adopted: a white
flag with two light green horizontal stripes on the edges and a
half-moon of the same colour in the middle.  The Muslims in
Bosnia and Herzegovina organized politically around this flag.36
On the day that the first press conference of the newly found-
ed party was held, the National Security Service of Bosnia and
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Herzegovina,37 the same service that had arrested Alija
Izetbegovic seven years earlier, pointed out in their internal
newsletter the growing Palestinian displeasure with the normaliza-
tion of relations between Yugoslavia and Israel, and warned that
certain radical Palestinian organizations might initiate terrorist
actions within SFRJ as a result. There was also a negative reaction
from the Arabic (Islam) countries on an economic level. 
The service also called attention to an increase in Iranian
nationals in Yugoslavia and reported that the number had grown
to 606 in 1989. They also claimed that there were promotors of
militaristic Shiite fundamentalism among them who had come into
being as a result of contacts with Afro-Asian (Islamic) nationals
and like-minded Yugoslav nationals.38
Four months later, in July, 1990, the service recorded a strong
reaction to the normalization of Yugoslav-Israeli relations, which
they propogate as a result of pressure applied  by the Serbian
leadership. Arabic sources warned that Yugoslavia, as chairman
of the non-aligned movement, must condition normalization of
relations with a change in Israeli policies towards the Arabic; that
is, the Palestinian world. Arabic sources were especially upset by
the organization of  “Serbian Week” in Israel and the publicity
afforded this event in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Some Islamic coun-
tries, such as Libya, Iraq, and Jordan, reacted in terms of eco-
nomical measures against Yugoslavia, and  especially Serbian
companies. At the same time, an Iraqi diplomat announced as a
“precautionary” measure that more attention and interest would
henceforth be devoted to the Muslim issue in Yugoslavia by
Islamic international organizations and countries, for they were
aware of the position of Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Service again warned of possible terrorist
attacks by radical Islamic groups.39
Earlier, in January, 1990, the National Security Service of
Bosnia and Herzegovina noted an attempt to form branches of the
“Muslim Brothers” organization in Tuzla, in north-eastern Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Mustafa Kemal, a Palestinian from Gaza and a
student of the Faculty of Civil Engineering in Zagreb, came to
Tuzla as a special delegate of the leadership of the “Muslim
Brothers” of Eastern Europe. In addition to propaganda activities,
Kemal also introduced the possibility of military training in 1990
for  members of the organization, and proposed that Mahmud
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Fudžami, a Jordan national and student at the School of Electrical
Engineering in Tuzla, attend. A suggestion was also made to add
several names to the leadership of the Eastern Europe “Muslim
Brothers”: Abdul Hakim Ismail, a student of the School of Dental
Medicine in Priština, and Halid Marei and Ali Taib, students of the
Medical Faculty of Zagreb.  In the estimation of the service’s best
information sources, Ali Taib who was at that time in Sudan,40 was
most likely to be elected president of the organization.
Already in March,1982, the leader of the “Muslim Brothers”
in Egypt, Hasan Naser, son of Gamal Abdel Naser, the ex-presi-
dent of Egypt and one of the founders of the non-aligned move-
ment, arrived in former Yugoslavia (through Zagreb to Belgrade).
He brought with him the “Ihvans”, younger members of the
“Muslim Brothers”, who applied to study at Yugoslav universities
but rarely completed their degrees.  The Egyptian government
learned of Naser’s arrival and made an inquiry to the Yugoslav
government, which denied the report; in other words, concealed
Naser’s presence.41
At the first democratic elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in
November, 1990, the SDA won 86 of 240 parliamentary man-
dates. Three  of seven members of the presidency were SDA can-
didates, and this explains how Alija Izetbegovic became President
of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and  politically the
most influential person in Bosnia and Herzegovina.42 Democracy
was soon thereafter replaced by war, and with the first shots
directed at Bosnia and Herzegovina “assistance” also arrived.
One such form of “assistance” for Bosnia and Herzegovina were
the numerous  “humanitarians”, who soon revealed themselves to
be mujahedeen, fighters of Allah’s path, fighters for Islam. 
Mujahedeen in Bosnia and Herzegovina
“We did not invite the mujehadeen; Croatians opened the door to
Bosnia and Herzegovina!” Alija Izetbegovic stated at his last press
conference as the president of the Democratic Action Party on
October 12 th, 2001.  He said it was the Croatians and not the
Bosnians who should explain why they allowed the Mujahedeen
into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izetbegovic conveniently forgot his
open letter to the President of Croatia, Franjo Tuðman, sent from
Geneva on January 28th, 1993, at a time when Croat-Muslim
relations were extremely volatile. The letter is a response to
Tuðman’s letter of the previous day. Izetbegovic first acquaints
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Tuðman with various offenses committed by Croatians in Bosnia
and Herzegovina; for example, the arrest of two directors of the
Islamic humanitarian organization “Igasse” in Busovaca, Galib es
Sufi and Abu Hasan Alija, and the theft of their money and
belongings valued at half a million German marks.  Izetbegovic
also complains about the general extortion of humanitarian aid
and refers to a statement by the secretary of the Humanitarian Aid
Association in Zurich.43
The identity of the  two directors and the justification for their
arrest and imprisonment in Busovaca prison is clear from a report
by the HVO Military Police, which states that on December 18th,
1992, they stopped a Mitsubishi all-terrain vehicle at the control
point, driven by Ali Muhammad, born 1944, a citizen of Great
Britain (passport number 700192046) and Pakistan (passport
number H407904).   In addition, Ali also had an identity card
from the Bosnian-Herzegovinan Army and a gun with a permit.
His fellow-traveller Galib Ali Elsofi, born 1966, a citizen of Sudan
(passport number R 12078) also had an identity card from the
Bosnian-Herzegovinan Army. His residence visa for study in
Bosnia and Herzegovina had expired and his presence in the
country was therefore illegal. After having been stopped, both
became violent and broke the official police vehicle’s wind-
shield.44 The names of the “humanitarians” were spelled incor-
rectly in Izetbegovic’s letter, but it is obvious that it was the same
two individuals. 
About twenty days earlier on November 28th, 1992, the
Defence department HZ HB had warned MORH in Zagreb about
the activities of the Kuwaiti humanitarian organization “Igass” in
connection with procurement of illegal arms and military equip-
ment in Croatia.  Representatives of the Islamic community, Salih
efendija colakovic, and the head imam of the IZ committee,
Prozor Elkaz efendija Hidajet,45 were directly involved in these
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activities.  On November 9th 1992, the HVO Military Police dis-
covered nine nationals from Islamic countries during a Split-
Kiseljak bus control who were carrying military equipment and
propaganda materials praising Islam  and inviting others to join
the holy war for Allah.46 Twenty packages of propaganda flyers
and instructions for waging special war were also found.47
“We invited the mujahedeen to Bosnia”, said Mustafa efendi-
ja Ceric,  the Resiu-l-ulema of the Islamic community in Bosnia
and Herzegovina on OBN’s contact show “Telering” in February
1999. “We invited them in from Algeria, Qatar, Afghanistan, and
other Islamic countries because we were endangered and needed
help. We should all be grateful to the mujahedeen”, added
Ceric.48
It is a fact that the mujahedeen came through Croatia; that is,
through Zagreb, with the cooperation or at least tolerance of the
Croatian government.  The SDA itself originated in Zagreb, in the
Islamic Cultural Center where a large group of Muslims led by
Salem Šabic and Šemsudin Tankovic regularly gathered.  It was
here the SDA platform, developed by approximately fifteen like-
minded people, came into existence.49 On April 8th ,1993, the
new Reisu-l-ulema of the Islamic community of Bosnia and
Herzegovina arrived from Zagreb: Mustafa Ceric, the former
imam of the Zagreb mosque.  Also coming to Bosnia and
Herzegovina through Zagreb was a transport of Iranian artillery
and military equipment, a fact about which Peter Galbraith, the
American ambassador to Croatia at that time, was called to testi-
fy before the U.S. Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee.50 As
a matter of fact, all the aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina passed
through Croatia. This is the route taken by the mujahedeneen,
who came under the auspices of several of the 33 Islamic human-
itarian organizations active in Croatia at that time (1992-1995)
and who later moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where in 1996,
216 foreign humanitarian organizations were registered.51
One with those with the closest ties to the Muslim government
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, to Alija Izetbegovic, was the
“Third World Relief Agency” (TWRA). Its founder and director is El
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Fatih Hassanein from Sudan, a former medical student in
Sarajevo. The co-founder is Derviš Ðurðevic, one of those who
stood trial with Izetbegovic and the others in Sarajevo,1983.  He
later moved to Vienna after he had served his sentence.52 The
TWRA was active in Vienna until the Austrian services uncovered
illegal activities and broke into their premises on September 5th
,1995.53 The TWRA provided many kinds of assistance for
Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but especially in supplying
artillery and military equipment and transferring mujahedeen to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. During 1993, TWRA money in Vienna
was handled by its founder and director, El Fatih Hassanein; one
of the chairman of the SDA, Hasan cengic, who was later the
Minister of Defense of the Bosnian and Herzegovinan Federation;
and one of the ideologues and founders of the SDA and former
President of the Parliament of Islamic Communities of Croatia and
Slovenia, Salim Šabic. About 350 million American dollars passed
through this organization.54 After searching the premises, the
Austrian police determined that the TWRA was also connected to
Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, a radical Egyptian imam sentenced
to life in prison in the United States for planning various terrorist
attacks against American targets. 
There were connections to other Islamic militants as well.
Hassanein himself stated in an interview for an Islamic magazine
in 1994: “Bosnia must be Muslim in the end because if that does
not happen, the whole war makes no sense and will have been
waged in vain.”55
Ties between Zagreb and the above-mentioned groups
should also be sought among Izetbegovic’s close friends from the
Croatian government of that time; that is, those he mentioned by
name in his “Memoirs”. 
Upon their arrival in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Islamic vol-
unteers formed the El Mujahid unit, which was part of the third
corpus of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, headquartered in
Zenica. In August 1995, an interview with the commander (Emir)
of the El Mujahedeen unit, Abu el Ma ali, appeared in the
Croatian media. The journalist estimated that the unit, which in
the words of the commander had come to Bosnia and
Herzegovina to offer assistance to the Muslims, had about 2000
members at that time. Abu el Ma ali said he was certain that Islam
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would rule the world and that he was dedicated to this cause. At
that time, Bosnian politician Haris Silajdžic expressed his intention
to summon volunteers from all over the world to fight “Serbian
fascism”, and Abu el Ma ali stated that their stay in Bosnia and
Herzegovina had confirmed such a need, and that many more
would come were it not for the interference of the Herzegovinan
Croats.56 The mujahedeen from the “El Mujahid” unit and other
units in Bosnia and Hercegovina represented a significant military
strength, and their presence was decisive in the raising morale of
the Bosnian-Muslim army.  Support from Alija Izetbegovic and the
Muslim government signified to the sponsors of BH Islamization
that the government was “on the right path”, and that their invest-
ment and engagement was justified. On the other hand, Bosnia
and Herzegovina served as their refuge and provided them with a
training site for the handling of diverse weapons and explosive
devices. Their presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina also enabled
Sefer Halilovic, chief of staff of the Supreme Command of the
Bosnian-Herzegovinan Army at that time, to vow in the Spanish
newspaper “El Pais” (January 1993)  that “no kind of negotiations,
not even those in Geneva, can destroy the idea of Bosnia as a
united and sovereign country. They can sign whatever they want in
Geneva! If those negotiations lead to a unitary Bosnia, we will
embrace them. If not, we will realize this kind of state on the bat-
tlefield. If Europe doesn’t change its attitude, we will take action
and bring terrorism to its territory. Many European cities will be in
flames.”57
During the war, a stream of terrorist attacks was committed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that is not the topic of this study. In
order to shed light upon the murders of Croatian military com-
manders Ivica Stojak, Vlado Šantic,  four soldiers from Živko
Totic’s company, and Živko Totic’s kidnapping, more time and
space is required, since this occurred during the war with the
Serbs, and in the period of the Muslim-Croat alliance.  It is there-
fore difficult to determine whether these were actually war crimes
or acts of terrorism.58
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The signing of international agreements in November and
December 1995, which will here be referred to simply as the
“Dayton Agreements”, put an end to the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. But the issues of reconstruction, damages, and
healing the wounds of war still had to be addressed.  An incident
in February 1996, however, showed that the restoration of peace
would be a difficult process. Members of the international forces
– IFOR - broke into the former hiking lodge on the Pogorelica
mountain near Fojnica and discovered a secret training camp of
the AID (Muslim Intelligence-Security Services). The instructors
were Iranian intelligence officers, members of the MOIS, three of
which were arrested during the operation. 
In addition to the Iranians, eight Bosnia-Herzogovinian
Muslim AID members were arrested as well. Not only were they
being trained for intelligence but also for terrorism.59 This scandal
resulted in the replacement of the director of AID.  Six weeks later,
the chairman of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, stated during an
interview to a newspaper with close ties to his party: “What hap-
pened in Pogorelica near Fojnica was a very big mistake on our
part.”60 On September 28, 1996, in Sarajevo, the Assistant to the
Director of AID, Nedžad Ugljen, was on his way to visit someone
he had called beforehand to announce his arrival when he was
killed in front of his building.61 Shortly before his death, Nedžad
Ugljen had spoken with Izetbegovic, said he feared he would be
killed, and identified to Izetbegovic the individuals who posed a
threat to him.62
In 1997, terrorists acts were committed almost daily. In the
first ten months, 35 explosives attacks occurred, and over 90% of
the attack targets were Croats. Other targets included 10 private
residences, 8 Catholic churches, 5 apartment complexes, 3 infra-
structure  objects and 2 mosques. Two (Croats) were killed, and
many others injured, seven severely.63 By the end of the year, four
more Croats had been killed. During 1998, the number of terror-
ist attacks rose to 132, and once again the majority of the victims
were Croats. Only in 25 cases were the perpetrators caught.64 It
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was later discovered that the terrorists, who had been accused of
ttacks on Croatian emigrants and who were being sought by the
Muslim (Bosniac) police were former members of El Mujahedeen
forces then living in a police-owned apartment.65 In addition to
these attacks, three other terrorist attacks show particularly clear-
ly the extent of the terrorism problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
One of the most important events in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
especially for its Catholics (Croats), was the announcement of the
arrival of Pope John Paul II to Sarajevo. On the day of his visit,
April 12, 1997, the Ministry of the Interior’s Anti-Terrorist
Protection Department (KDZ)  of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina discovered during its third inspection of the area a
large amount of explosives ready to be activated by remote con-
trol under a bridge on the Miljacka river, placed placed along the
route Pope John Paul II would be traveling that day. The KDZ
deactivated the explosive device and eliminated the threat.66 At the
same time, a Muslim citizen (Bosniac), Husein Barjaktarevic,
noticed a large  explosive device in a sewer on the Kiseljak-
Sarajevo road. He stopped an SFOR vehicle, and the SFOR sol-
diers then removed the explosive. It was determined that it was set
to be activated by remote control, but SFOR later announced it
was an explosive left over from the war, although they themselves
had checked the entire route the previous day to ensure against
diversionary activities and found nothing. The following day, April
13th, the police picked up Barjakterevic in his cottage near
Kiseljak after which was then taken to the federal police station in
Sarajevo where he was questioned about the circumstances sur-
rounding his having found the explosive. After the interrogation,
which was attended by KDZ department head, Mirza Jamakovic,
Barjaktarevic (a Muslim) was given a rosary and pictures of
Catholic saints by the Muslim police officers who had questioned
him. They told him that they were gifts from the Pope.
Barjaktarevic then reported this to the Kiseljak police station, while
at the same time the family home in which he had previously lived
was set afire in the village ofTulice.67 The KDZ department head of
the Ministry of the Interior, Mirza Jamakovic, was arrested on
September 25, 2001 for illegal weapons trafficking from Bosnia
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and Herzegovina to Kosovo. After five days imprisonment, he was
transferred to the prison hospital.68
On January 22, 1995 an accident occurred near Travnik
involving a Nissan. Three automatic rifles, two bombs, two guns,
and a large amount of ammunition and military gear was found
on the driver, a citizen of Saudi Arabia, Ahmed Zuhair, son of
Zeda. He was born on October 16, 1965, in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, and also carried a Saudi passport, number A216281,
and an official identity card, number 0000914 issued by the
Croatian Ministry of the Interior, which he had received as a mem-
ber of the humanitarian organization “Charitable Community for
Orphans”. He also had an official military declaration from the
BH army allowing him freedom of movement, which was certified
with a stamp from the chain of command of the reconnaissance
and diversion batallion of the seventh corps of the BH army, and
a travel order from the El Mujahedeen units. Husnija Kubur, a
Muslim Bosniac from cajnic was also in the vehicle with Zuhair.69
After the tape on Zuhair had been broadcast on television, a fifty-
year-old woman (FB) from Vitez recognized him as being a mem-
ber of the mujahedeen unit which had attacked her village on
September 18, 1993. She specifically recognized Zuhair because
he had tried to kill her son (M.B. 14 years old), who was a minor,
with a knife. Zuhair sent a letter from prison to “his brothers in the
high Saudi Commission for Abu Yaqubo” requesting that the let-
ter then be forwarded to Basim Al Atas. Zuhair stated that he was
working for Walid Saati in a humanitarian organization assisting
orphans, and was thus seeking their assistance. The addressees
were asked to obtain for Zuhair documents from the UNHCR to
show that his presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was for
humanitarian purposes.70 He was released in May 1997.  Four
months later, on September 18,1997 at 11:40 p.m., a highly-
destructive car bomb exploded near an apartment complex in the
western part of Mostar. Three people were severely injured and
forty others  suffered minor injuries from the explosion. Ninety-four
apartments were damaged, along with 96 automobiles, and 13
offices and garages.  Haris Silajdžic was among the first to com-
ment on the explosion,  accusing Croats of being the perpetrators.
Several journalists with links to the intelligence underground
immediately accepted this theory and thus a whole campaign was
launched in support of it. Yet the perpetrators were ultimately iden-
131
68- Investigation of weapons trafficking from BH to Kosovo, Dnevni avaz, 3.11.2001-
p.37.
69- Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian Republic of Herzegovina and Bosnian
Ministry of the Interior, Travnik Police Department with headquarters in Vitez, no.
03.-12.-2/1.-54./96.
70- Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian Republic of Herzegovina and Bosnia HVO
ZP  Vitez, no. 02.-08.-14.-4587./96 01.03.1996.
tified as Ahmed Zuhair, a.k.a. Handal, and Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad,
a.k.a. Ubeid. They had been assisted by Saleh Nedal, a.k.a.
Jemen and Vlado Populovski, a.k.a. Macedonian. in the planning
of the explosion. A few days later, Nedal warned Zuhair that the
police were looking for him and that he should go into hiding.71
Ahmed Zuhair and Ali Ahmed Hamad had initially come to
Mostar on September 11, 1997, in order to research the situation
and confirm where they would plant the car bomb several days
later.72 The same day their co-conspirator, Saleh Nedal, was
issued a passport, no. BA584607, by the Ministry of the Interior
of BH in the district of Sarajevo, and he registered his address as
8 Džamijska, Sarajevo.
A year later, on September 8, 1998, deputy district attorneys
Dr. Paolo Giogavnoli and Dr. Maria Vittoria De Simone of
Bologna, Italy, issued an international warrant for a group of crim-
inals responsible for a series of crimes in Italy, among them ter-
rorist acts. The eighth individual on the list was Saleh Nedal. Italy
requested his extradition and on April 13, 1999, the district court
in Travnik arrested him based on Interpol’s request of December
14, 1998. The Investigating Croatian  Judge, Mirjana Grubešic73
and the County District Attorney in Travnik, Croat prosecutor
Marinko Jurcevic, asked the County Court in Travnik to comply
with the Italian request to extradite Nedal.74 The county court in
Travnik presided over by Judge Senad Begovic ( a Muslim
Bosniac) ruled on July 12, 1999, against the extradition of Nedal
to Italy.75
The same judge then signed a decree which terminated
Nedal’s imprisonment and released him.76 The Supreme Court of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina affirmed the decree,
which was signed by Judge Nazif Sulman ( a Muslim Bosniac) on
August 19, 1999.77 After being warned by Saleh Nedal, Ahmed
Zuhair fled and thus avoided standing trial before the County
Court in Zenica which began on September 18,1998, the
anniversary of the explosion. The accused Ubeid had admitted
committing the crime during the police investigation and made
the same admission before an investigating judge, only to deny it
all during trial and state that the police had coerced him by prom-
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ising a quick trial followed by his release.78 The accused was not
charged with terrorism, but rather, as the court in Zenica classified
it, constructing a car bomb, “a criminal act endangering the gen-
eral safety of people and property”, and as a result, all the
accused received lighter sentences. The longest sentence, eight
years in prison, was given to Ali Ahmed, since Zuhair’s ten-year-
sentence would never be served.79
The legal explanation used by the defense attorney, Almin
Dautbegovic, was interesting. He claimed that in a terrorist indict-
ment based on (BH) regulations, it is necessary to prove that the
perpetrator had hostile motives towards BH during the perpetra-
tion of the crime.  In other words, that there existed a subjective
desire on the perpetrator’s part to commit this crime so as to harm
or destroy the country, BH.  Based upon this, it would be very dif-
ficult for a prosecutor to prove that individuals who had come to
BH in order to fight for its survival had committed these heinous
crimes in order to harm the country.80 The judge accepted this def-
inition of terrorism. It is also interesting to note that, according to
Article 168 of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Penal
Code,81 international terrorism is defined as:  “Intentionally harm-
ing a foreign country, liberation movement, or international
organization….”82 It would also be interesting to explore what the
legislation meant by the term “liberation movement”. Therefore,
according to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s laws,
the car bomb plot in Mostar was not a terrorist act, because
Zuhair “only wanted to take revenge on the Croats”, while those
responsible for the murder of Anwar el Sha’abana (Abd Al
Rahman, international terrorist who was a member of at least one
international humanitarian organization, although he had origi-
nally come in order defend BH in the war) could conceivably be
prosecuted for terrorism. 
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Deputy Minister
of the Interior, Jozo Leutar, reacted many times to the burlesque of
trials and investigations, once in a letter to the International Police
Force ( IPTF) in November 1997, in which he pointed out the pres-
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ence of Abu Hamze and Karai Kamil Bin Alia in central Bosnia, in
spite of a warrant having been issued for their arrest.  Many oth-
ers who had warrants against them were also walking around
freely in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.83
On March 16, 1999, shortly before 8:00 a.m., a bomb which
had been planted beneath Deputy Minister of the Interior Jozo
Leutar’s official automobile, which had been parked in Alipasian
Street in downtown Sarajevo near the American embassy, explod-
ed. The bomb was activated while the car was in motion. Leutar
suffered severe physical injuries, while his driver, Željko Cosic, and
the passenger, Ivo Rezo, sustained lesser physical injuries.
A month later, on April 16, 1999, Mounir Hanouf, Muhamed
Abu Gazali, and Murat Bas, a.k.a. the “ Igman Group” were
arrested.  Objects were found on them connecting them to the ter-
rorist attacks. During a police search of Abu Gazali’s apartment
on July 12, 1999, police found a another series of objects direct-
ly linked to the terrorist attacks. Muhamed Abu Gazali had come
to Bosnia and Herzegovina one day before the attack on Leutar,
on March 15, 1999.  Problems immediately arose at the begin-
ning of the investigation. First, the investigating judge tried to
remove Croatian police officers from the investigation, and evi-
dence on the Igman Group gathered during the investigation was
hidden from the Croatian police officers.  Alija Izetbegovic com-
mented publicly about the Leutar assassination, stating:” This was
either done by our (Muslim Bosniac) fools or by Croatian extrem-
ists.” He also added that the assassins of Kennedy, Palme, and
Alda Mora had never been identified, implying that this case
would also never be solved. The media complicated matters fur-
ther, fueling speculation.  Anyone who got in the way of the influ-
ential politicians was charged with something.  Politics was appar-
ently controlling the investigation. 
Soon thereafter, U.N. Mission Chief in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Jacques Klein, compromised himself by stating that
he had certain evidence and that the guilty parties would soon be
brought to justice. The tragedy was then used for pre-election
campaign purposes and a wave of indictments was issued. After
a superficial and disgraceful investigation, Klein seemed to have
lost much of his self-confidence.  In an interview on November
23, 2000, he said he had only reported things which had been
told to him by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. 84
On April 6, 2000, the Investigating Judge, Idriz Kamenica,
issued a indictment against six Croat suspects believed to be
implicated in Jozo Leutar’s murder, Deputy Minister of the Interior
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and HDZ (Croatian Democration Union) president in the county
of Sarajevo. According to the prosecution theory, the suspects had
committed the crime in order to cause the collapse of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby qualifying them as
terrorists.85
The charges in the indictment are comparable to the propa-
ganda that was issued  from the Serbian side after the Markale
market massacre in Sarajevo.   They claimed at the time that the
Muslims had themselves committed the massacre in order to shift
blame to the Serbs.  The entire indictment was based on a state-
ment  made by a “protected witness”, who was said to be a
vicious criminal and a former mental patient. The trial is still  con-
tinuing.
On November 21, 2001, during the 27th session, the
defense stated that Leutar had been killed by the same individuals
who had set the bombs during the Pope’s visit and killed Croats
in Travnik.86
Terrorist attacks on the USA
The tragic events which occurred on September 11, 2001, in the
USA made a serious impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Feelings
were divided, and statements given unanimously condemned the
attacks, though the attacks themselves were analyzed in different
ways. In any case, anyone who believed he had political or social
influence issued a statement. The SFOR units in Bosnia and
Herzegovina were in the most sensitive position, as they were
forced to carefully assess their situation and determine whether or
not they were at war. The first week after the attacks on the US, a
veritable political chaos prevailed. Some claimed that Western
civilization was endangered by militant Islam, and accused the
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina of supporting terrorism;
others defended Islam, claiming that terrorism is in contradiction
to Islam, for terrorism has no religion, and quoting various pas-
sages from the Ku’ran which prohibit the commission of evil acts.
Others pointed out  that the true terrorists were Karadžic and oth-
ers like him.  The politicians  wanted simply to be on the politically
correct side in order to reap political and personal gains. 
Izetbegovic then distanced himself from the mujahedeen, stat-
ing that they had not invited “them”, and thereafter, SFOR com-
mander General Sylvester said (October 12, 2001) that the muja-
hedeens posed no threat to Bosnia and Herzegovina.87 Just a
week after his statement, the American and British embassies and
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consulates closed down. A week after that, five foreigners ( muja-
hedeen) were arrested in BH. The Head Secretary of NATO,
George Robertson, confirmed that at least one of those arrested
had links to Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda.88 The Deputy Minister
of the Interior of the Federation of BH, Tomislav Limov, released
information that the Federal police had 17 suspects linked to
international terrorism under observation, and also confirmed that
between 1996 to the present day (30.10.2001), approximately
1000 individuals from Arabic countries had received Bosnian cit-
izenship. He emphasizsed that problems do exist in Bosnia, and
that rumors about Bosnia being a safe haven for terrorists were
not, in fact, groundless.89 The new American ambassador Bond
said on November 10, 2001, that it was not Bosnia as a whole
that posed a terrorist threat, but only certain individuals.90 The
International Crisis Group (ICG) then reported only two days later
that Bosnia and Herzegovina posed the only true threat of terror-
ism in south-eastern Europe.91
Ivo Komšic, vice-president of SDP (Social Democratic Party),
the most powerful party in the governing coalition, said they were
informed by other party members of the executive branch of gov-
ernment at a meeting of the party heads (November 3, 2001) that
the battle against terrorism in Bosnia was only in its initial stages.
Komšic also added that he had not known that Bosnia had been
ranked among high-risk countries.92
After successful operations in Afghanistan, the press released
information that a Bosnian passport and a notebook in Bosnian
with instructions on how to make explosive devices had been
found in a house in Kabul which had been used by members of
the Al Qaeda,93 This information was confirmed shortly thereafter;
however, not only one but two passports were found, belonging to
individuals, according to the Prime Minister of the Federation of
BH Alija Behmen, whose citizenship had been revoked just a few
days earlier. 94 The federal Ministry of the Interior then revoked the
citizenship of 94 others who had come from Islamic countries and
had obtained citizenship illegally. 95 Investigating the illegal
issuance of citizenship is difficult, as those who enabled it still
occupy high positions in the government and are thus protected.
The following case provides an illustration: two police officers,
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Samir Rizvo and Mirsad Žutic Beganovic were proven to have par-
ticipated in the illegal issuance of BH citizenship to mujahedeen,
yet were promoted by the new federal government of BH. It is
especially indicative that Mirsad Žutic Beganovic was promoted to
Secretary to the Minister in the Ministry of the Interior, thus putting
him in the position of invalidating the citizenship  decisions he
himself had previously made. What is even more interesting is the
decision of French general Vincent Courderoy, International Police
Commissioner of the UN (IPTF), to revoke on November 15,
2001, the work permits of two police officers who had attempted
to murder Fikret Abdic, a former member of the Presidency of BH,
a former vice-president of the SDA ( Democratic Action Party) in
BH, and the former president of the autonomous region of west-
ern Bosnia. 
Abdic, who had once been Izetbegovic’s most influential col-
league, later became his most bitter adversary. Bihac police offi-
cers, Derviš Demirovic and Hajrudin Halilagic had attempted to
kill Abdic, who was in Rijeka in the Republic of Croatia at that
time. The Croatian police arrested them with weapons and explo-
sives  and they were charged with endangering the safety of citi-
zens in the Republic of Croatia by an act of terrorism and sen-
tenced to prison sentences of 18 months, which translates to 12
months in the Croatian judicial system.
After having served their sentences, they returned to their jobs
in the Bihac police department.96 This was more than sufficient
grounds for Abdic’s party, the Democratic People’s Union of BH,
to assert that the SDA was the organizer of state terrorism.  They
also pointed out that the unsuccessful assassination attempt was
masterminded by Ejub Ikic, Chief of AID ( the Bosnian Intelligence
Agency) of BH and Sakib Mahmuljin, the former commander of
the third corps in the BH army in which the El Mujahedeen force
was incorporated. The DNZ also announced that information had
emerged in Rijeka that two additional members of the terrorist
group were currently employed as professional soldiers in the fifth
corps of the BH army.
Three days prior to publication of the French general’s deci-
sion on the dismissal of the two police officers in the media, the
Sarajevo daily “Dnevni avaz” almost shamefacedly carried a
report from the Italian newspaper  “Corriere de la Sera” from
November 11, 2001. Its article concerned the Bosnian govern-
ment’s extradition to Egypt of  Hasan Masud El Sharif Saad, who
was suspected of being implicated in the car bomb planted in
front of the Rijeka police station (Republic of Croatia) in October
1995. According to American and European investigators, Hasan
Masud El Sharif Saad was one of Bin Laden’s key people in
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Europe. Based on an Interpol warrant, Hasan Masud El Sharif
Saad had been arrested with two other countrymen and extradit-
ed to Egypt.97 One might have thought at that point that the threat
of terrorism in BH had been repelled.  Especially after a meeting
of the heads of BH with SFOR commander general Sylvester, dur-
ing which it was stated that there was no outright threat of terror-
ism, at least not to SFOR troops.98 Yet only two days later, the
Director of the Federal Border Agency, Tomo Mihalj, claimed to
have information that a certain number of Al Qaeda members
had set out to central Europe through Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to
Bosnia and Herzegovina after being defeated in Afghanistan.99
It is clearly difficult to fight international terrorism, especially
without a effective security system. It is no surprise that  after SFOR
forces arrested a man in Kiseljak(central Bosnia) in a spectacular
operation with special forces on November 30, 2001- under sus-
picion of  trafficking in radioactive material from which atomic
bombs could be constructed -  they released him from prison three
days later. While searching the house, they succeeded in confis-
cating ground paprika, among other things, but no bombs.100
These and similar actions show that members of the International
Forces continue to be duped by local criminals and their fabrica-
tions, partially due to their desire to prove themselves and also
due to fear.  
How then can we define the Bosnian-Herzegovinan Muslim
position toward terrorism? After a war which they neither initiated
nor provoked, can we still designate them Europe’s “special”
Muslims? “ “Bosnian-style Muslims”, as Alija Izetbegovic said in a
statement in the Institute for War and Peace Reporting’s (WPR) last
edition?101 “ Radicalism is alien to the Bosnian spirit, and funda-
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mentalist elements comprise only a small minority”, Izetbegovic
pointed out.102
Only a day after the statement had been released to the BH
media, Alija Izetbegovic left on December 3, 2001, by special
charter flight to Dubai, the capital of the United Arab Emirates.
The plane had been specially sent for him so that he could receive
an award for “ Islam Personality of the Year”. Reisu-l-ulema
Mustafa Ceric and the president of the SDA, Sulejman Tihic,  trav-
elled with him.103
Izetbegovic described his relationship with the Albanians in his
memoirs, several of which were with him in prison in Foce.  he
wrote that they were quiet, secretive, and much too serious.  On
one occasion, one of the Albanian inmates, the leader of their
group, requested to speak to Izetbegovic about their movement,
to which Izetbegovic replied:  “Albanians are Muslims and that is
the main reason we support your fight for freedom.”104 Izetbegovic
went on to say that Albanians had caused a lot of problems, a
view with which the leader of their delegation disagreed.  In his
opinion, religion had played a negative role in the history of the
Albanian people and had benefitted only the occupiers. Thus, reli-
gion was unnecessary for their fight for freedom. He further assert-
ed that only Marxism and Leninism had brought progress to their
people. Izetbegovic disagreed with him on this, and said that they
if that were the case, then they were the only nation on earth that
was able to survive without  religion and that he believed the
majority of Albanians would disagree with this statement.  At that
point, the two “ delegations”, with their two political views, tem-
porarily parted ways.105
That they had at least maintained some contact was evident
by the arrest of the KDZ department of the Ministry of the Interior
( Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) Mirza Jamakovic for ille-
gally exporting weapons to Kosovo. This could have been regard-
ed as simple smuggling, that is, a criminal offence, up until
December 21, 2001, until the arrest of Bosniac Muslim general
Hamid Bahto of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bahto had also served as Assistant to the Minister of Defense for
Intelligence Affairs in the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.106 What part did the Intelligence component of the
Federal army under Bosnian Muslim control play? Who or what
stood behind it? This can be explained by the example of a cer-
tain judicial inquiry.
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On invitation of the Israeli Minister of Defense, B. Ben Elizer,
the Defense Minister of the Federation, Mijo Anic, traveled to
Israel on December 10, 2001. The Federal Ministry of Defense
announced that Anic would be travelling with the Deputy Assistant
of Defense for the military industry, Pero Džepina, and several
directors of central Bosnian companies which manufactured
weapons and military gear.107 This trip provoked heated reaction
from Bosniac politicians and the general population.  Alija
Izetbegovic, the honorary president of the strongest Bosniac party,
the SDA, posed the following question at a press conference led
by its vice-president: “Is Anic selling weapons bought for us (
Bosnia-Herzegovinian Muslims) by Islamic nations to Israel?”108
Only a few days after this scandal,  Defense Minister Mijo
Anic found himself in the limelight again, due to a statement by
Ceric’s on Studio 99’s television show “Interview of the Day”,
December 19, 2001. Ceric complained bitterly about the fact that
on November 25, 2001, during the celebration of Bosnia and
Herzegovinan’s Independence Day celebration in the Military
Federation Centre in Sarajevo, pork was being served even
though Muslims had begun Bajram fasting.109
The tumultuous events of 2001 exhausted Izetbegovic, and by
the end of December his state of health was very grave. So at the
invitation of the Saudi king Fahd, who sent a plane for him,
Izetbegovic was transported to Rijadh to receive any necessary
medical attention. Eight days later Izetbegovic returned to
Sarajevo.110
Authorities of the Federation reported on Friday, January 18,
2002, that in the early hours of the morning they had surrendered
six individuals of Algerian citizenship to the government of the
USA. These individuals had been in custody since October 2001
under suspicion of having links to individuals and organizations in
the international terrorist network.111 This extradition caused an
uproar among the Bosniac Muslim public, but this time the
response was well-organized, with demonstrators and the media
present. They also had political support and strong legal and
human rights arguments. Everything perfectly arranged. After this,
the term “Islamic groups” came into regular use. Many public fig-
ures reacted to this with shock, and it ultimately  caused the col-
lapse of the Helsinki Committee, whose president Srðan
Dizdarevic showed support for the Algerians and thus lost non-
Muslim members Todorovic and Kukic.112 Yet, even more impor-
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tant than these verbal disputes were the events that occurred on
the Sarajevo streets on  Friday, January 18, 2002.  In a night of
conflict between demonstrators and police, the Islamic groups in
Bosnia demonstrated their clout, organizational skills, and will.113
These events inspired Zija Dizdarevic of Sarajevo’s
“Osloboðenje” to write the following: “ Bosnia and Herzegovina
is confronted with a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. This new
Islamic youth movement is an idealogical and political reality, but
it remains to be seen whether it will be an important factor in th
future of   Bosnia and Herzegovina.”114
Once again, Izetbegovic’s statement of December 2001: “
Radicalism is foreign to the Bosnian spirit, and elements of fun-
damentalism are only part of a small minority.” Terrorism in
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not come about spontaneously; it did
not arise from the Bosnian milieu and it definitely is not part of
Bosnian and Herzegovinan mentality. It was imported into Bosnia
and Herzegovina, brought in during the Yugoslavia’s existence,
and its presence continues even after the collapse of Yugoslavia.
Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not attributable to any
individual or group, but it part of the system and therefore a polit-
ical problem. These were the policies of non-aligned Yugoslavia
and later the project of Islamization of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The consequence of some of these policies has been, in fact, ter-
rorism. James Rubin, the former State Department spokesperson,
told Croatian politicians that they could bear witness to what the
Americans had done for Muslims in Europe ( Bosnia and
Herzegovina), because it was a known fact that the American
administration at that time was considered pro-Muslim, though it
seems the Arabs have forgotten this.115
Not only have the Arabs forgetten, but so too the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian Muslims (Bosniacs). Everyone has forgotten but the
Croats, who were forced into a federation with the Muslims and
thus had to resolve the problem Europe could not - the spread of
Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Islam is the joining of religion
with the state, as Dr. Abdullah Omer Nasif, Secretary General of
the World Islamic League Senior Council wrote  in the official jour-
nal of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.116
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The fact that many Europeans fear Islam is understandable,
especially after the events of September 11, 2001.  This explains,
for example, the denial of visas by France, Holland, and
Switzerland to Imams designated by the Islamic community in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to organize religious activities among the
Bosnian diaspora population during the month of Ramadan.117
This fear was also referred to by the former Vice-Chancellor
of Austria, Erhard Busek, coordinator of the American Initiative for
south-eastern Europe (SECI) in an interview on March 8, 2001.118
A major part of European political policy toward the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was governed by that same fear. “Why hasn’t
Bosnia and Herzegovina become a Muslim state yet?” asks Enver
cauševic in the Islamic Community weekly Rijaset of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. “Because”, he says, “there is a shortage of power
and will needed to transform lethargy and general hopelessness
into action. To intensify the struggle for a return to the basic val-
ues of Islam and to those individuals who will preserve them for
our children.”119
The will is increasing, as well as the power supplied by the
Islamic centres which are appearing throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina and which are completely different from mosques,
even though they are located in their backyards.
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